One in three elections happens in times of conflict.
To illustrate our assumptions, we consider the case of Afghanistan in 2005. As the first parliamentary election since 1988, it marks an important milestone in the democratization process, at a time when the strongest non-state armed actor, the Taliban, increasingly regained control of particular regions. Our map displays these areas in light grey and plots the share of violence -both for state-based and one-sided violence -as a percentage of the accumulated violence of the past 12 months of the date of the attack in red. 4 Starting 180 days prior to the election day 5 , we observe an increase in violence the closer the election gets. Most importantly, this increase is clustered in the stronghold regions of the Taliban as time proceeds. Especially when we zoom in on the last 30 days before the election, our map illustrates that the large majority of attacks happen in the most important areas for the Taliban: Helmand, Zabul, and Kandahar.
6 These districts were alsotraditionally the Taliban's strongholds where they ran most of their lucrative narcotics trade.
Our map thus highlights that there are two important spatial dimensions that explain the link between elections and violence. On the one hand, time plays a role where closer to the election, violence increases. On the other hand, this increase in violence is regionally clustered in areas that are controlled by a non-state armed actor. As a result, we find support for our assumption that an election can trigger specific regional patterns of violence and we expect to observe similar findings in other countries.
